

## Message Text

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USMBFR

E.O. 11652: GDS  
TAGS: PARM MBFR NATO GW UK  
SUBJECT: POSSIBLE FUTURE STEPS IN MBFR NEGOTIATIONS

REF: (A) LONDON 14769, (B) STATE 211556

ROLAND SMITH, DEFENSE DEPT, FCO, PASSED TO POL-MIL  
ATTACHE COPY OF UK REACTIONS TO FRG PAPER WHICH HE  
ASKED WE CONVEY TO DEPARTMENT ASAP. HE SAID PAPER WILL  
INTEREST US AS IT SETS OUT THE POINTS HMG THINKS ARE  
APPROPRIATE FOR A POSSIBLE NEXT WESTERN MOVE. THE PAPER  
WHICH WE QUOTE IN FULL HAS BEEN CLEARED BY MINISTERS.

BEGIN TEXT: POSSIBLE FUTURE STEPS IN MBFR NEGOTIATIONS

1. THE UK HAS STUDIED THE GERMAN PAPER CAREFULLY, AND  
IS GRATEFUL FOR THIS VALUABLE CONTRIBUTION TO ALLIED  
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DISCUSSION. THERE ARE MANY POINTS IN IT WITH WHICH WE  
AGREE, ALTHOUGH ON OTHERS WE HAVE SOME DOUBTS. WE THINK  
THAT THE MAIN OBJECTIVE OF THE FORTHCOMING TRIPARTITE  
MEETING SHOULD BE TO CONSIDER THE PURPOSES OF A POSSIBLE  
ALLIED MOVE IN THE NEGOTIATIONS AND TO AGREE ON THE  
POSSIBLE CONTENT OF SUCH A MOVE. WE ENVISAGE A MODEST  
MOVE IN THE FORM OF A LIMITED PACKAGE DESIGNED TO PUT

THE BALL FIRMLY AND UNEQUIVOCALLY BACK IN THE EASTERN COURT. BUT CLEARLY THE CONTENT AND THE TIMING OF SUCH A MOVE WILL REQUIRE CAREFUL STUDY BOTH TRIPARTITELY AND WITHIN THE ALLIANCE AS A WHOLE.

2. THIS PAPER, WHICH IS OFFERED AS AN INPUT TO THE TRIPARTITE MEETING, COMMENTS ON THE MAIN POINTS OF THE GERMAN PAPER. IT CONCLUDES WITH A POSSIBLE DRAFT OF GUIDANCE FROM THE COUNCIL TO THE AD HOC GROUP, SETTING OUT THOSE FEATURES OF THE GERMAN PROPOSALS WHICH THE UK WOULD LIKE TO SEE INCORPORATED IN AN ALLIED MOVE.

3. THE FOLLOWING ARE OUR COMMENTS ON THE GERMAN PAPER:

PARAS 1-4. WE AGREE WITH ALMOST EVERYTHING IN THESE PARAGRAPHS. HOWEVER, ALTHOUGH WE RECOGNISE THAT ANY MOVE THAT THE ALLIES MAKE WILL BE INFLUENCED BY PROGRESS IN THE DATA DISCUSSION, WE ASSUME THAT PARA 4 IS NOT INTENDED TO IMPLY THAT THE WEST SHOULD MAKE NO MOVE AT ALL UNTIL THERE IS AGREEMENT ON DATA. RATHER, WE TAKE IT THAT WHAT IS MEANT IS THAT AN UNDERSTANDING ON DATA IS A PREREQUISITE FOR AN MBFR AGREEMENT. WE SHOULD BE GRATEFUL FOR CONFIRMATION THAT THIS IS THE CORRECT INTERPRETATION.

PARA 5. WE DO NOT THINK THAT EITHER PROGRESS IN SALT II OR AGREEMENT ON DATA SHOULD BE PRE-CONDITIONS FOR A NATO INITIATIVE ON MBFR. WHILST THERE IS CLEARLY

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A LINK BETWEEN THE CONTENT OF A POSSIBLE INITIATIVE AND ITS TIMING WE THINK THAT WORK IN THE ALLIANCE ON THE CONTENT COULD BE PURSUED, IN THE LIGHT OF THE AGREED OBJECTIVE OF A WESTERN INITIATIVE, WITHOUT ANY FINAL DECISION ON TIMINO.

PARA 7. SEE COMMENTS ON PARA 4.

PARAS 10-11. WE HAVE CERTAIN RESERVATIONS ABOUT THE IDEA OF EDITIONS BY EQUAL PERCENTAGES TO A COMMON CEILING, ON THE FOLLOWING GROUNDS:

A. IT WOULD NOT FIT IN EASILY WITH THE PRESENT NATO HROPPOSALS FOR PHASE I. IF WE WERE TO RETAIN OUR DEMANDS FOR THE WITHDRAWAL OF 68,000 SOVIET AND 29,000 US PERSONNEL, ON THE BASIS OF NATO FIGURES, THE SOVIET UNION AND THE US WOULD EACH REDUCE THEIR FORCES BY DIFFERENT PERCENTAGES OF THE "OVERHANG" AND THE RATIONALE OF "EQUAL PERCENTAGE" REDUCTIONS WOULD NOT APPLY. FOR EXAMPLE FOR A CEILING SET AT 700,000, THE SOVIET UNION WOULD REDUCE BY 26 PERCENT OF THE OVERHANG COMPARED WITH 32 PERCENT BY THE US. EQUAL PERCENTAGE REDUCTIONS WOULD REQUIRE THE SOVIET UNION TO WITHDRAW ABOUT 83,000 IN PHASE I SO AS TO BRING THE TOTAL UP TO 32 PERCENT OF THE OVERHANG. ONE ALTERNATIVE WOULD

BE TO HAVE SMALLER US REDUCTIONS IN PHASE I. THESE FIGURES, AND INDEED THIS WHOLE APPROACH TO REDUCTIONS,

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ARE DEPENDENT BOTH ON AGREEMENT TO NATO DATA AND ON THE LEVEL OF THE COMMON CEILING. GIVEN THAT WE ARE VERY FAR FROM GAINING EASTERN ACCEPTANCE OF THE SIZE OF THE PRESENT DISPARITIES, AGREEMENT ON DATA IS CLEARLY A MAJOR IMPEDIMENT TO THE PURSUIT OF THIS PARTICULAR PROPOSAL. MOREOVER ANY FIGURES WHICH THE WEST PUT FORWARD AS EQUAL PERCENTAGES OF THE "OVERHANG" WOULD INVOLVE THE IMPLICIT TABLING OF RED DATA, WHICH WOULD NEED TO BE CAREFULLY CONSIDERED;

B. THE PROPOSAL MIGHT MAKE IT HARDER TO SECURE WITHDRAWAL OF SOVIET TANKS, WHICH FORMS AN ESSENTIAL PART OF THE WEST'S DEMANDS, SINCE IT WOULD PROVIDE NO RATIONALE FOR THE MAINTENANCE OF SUCH A DEMAND.

THE UK ALSO HAS RESERVATIONS ABOUT THE PROPOSAL THAT AFTER THE COMPLETION OF REDUCTIONS TO THE COMMON CEILING, THE SOVIET AND US SUB-CEILINGS WOULD BE MAINTAINED AT THE POST-PHASE I LEVEL. IT IS SOVIET FORCES

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WHICH CONSTITUTE THE MAIN THREAT TO THE ALLIANCE, AND IT IS NO EXAGGERATION TO SAY THAT THE SUCCESS OF ANY MBFR AGREEMENT WILL IN LARGE PART BE MEASURED BY WHAT REDUCTIONS IN, AND LIMITATIONS ON, SOVIET FORCES IT SECURES. THE PROPOSAL TO MAINTAIN THE SUB-CEILING FOR SOVIET FORCES AT THE POST-PHASE I LEVEL WOULD MAKE IT DIFFICULT FOR THE WEST TO PRESS FOR ANY FURTHER SOVIET REDUCTIONS. THE WEST WOULD BE ACCEPTING THAT WHEREAS SOVIET GROUND FORCES CONSTITUTE 49.5 PERCENT OF TOTAL WARSAW PACT GROUND FORCES, THEY NEED PROVIDE ONLY 26 PERCENT OF WARSAW PACT REDUCTIONS (IF THE COMMON CEILING WERE SET AT 700,000); AND THAT AS A RESULT, THE SOVIET UNION'S SHARE OF WARSAW PACT GROUND FORCE MANPOWER COULD INCREASE FROM 49.5 PERCENT TO OVER 58 PERCENT.

FOR ALL THESE REASONS, THE UK WOULD HESITATE TO INCLUDE THIS PARTICULAR FEATURE OF THE GERMAN PROPOSALS IN THE SUGGESTED ALLIED INITIATIVE. THE UK WOULD BE HAPPY TO STUDY THE PROPOSAL FURTHER, BUT IN A LONGER TIME-SCALE THAN SOME OF THE OTHER ELEMENTS. THE UK WOULD ALSO LIKE TO SEE STUDY OF ANOTHER PROPOSAL ON SUB-CEILINGS WHICH HAS BEEN MOOTED IN THE PAST, NAMELY THAT NO ONE COUNTRY SHOULD BE ALLOWED TO PROVIDE MORE THAN A FIXED PERCENTAGE (SAY 50 PERCENT) OF THE FORCES WITHIN THE COLLECTIVE COMMON CEILING.

PARA 12. THIS IS AN IMPORTANT PARAGRAPH, ON WHICH THE UK WOULD WELCOME FURTHER ELABORATION OF GERMAN THINKING. ONE OF THE FEATURES OF THE EXISTING WESTERN PROPOSALS TO WHICH THE EAST OBJECTS IS THAT, APART FROM THE US, THE OTHER WESTERN PARTICIPANTS ARE NOT OFFERING A DEFINITE COMMITMENT TO REDUCTIONS. THE COMMON CEILING INDICATES THE SCOPE OF WESTERN REDUCTION COMMITMENTS IN PHASE II, BUT THE EAST HAVE ALSO PRESSED FOR A COMMITMENT ON TIMING. THE OFFER OF SUCH A COMMITMENT MIGHT

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TEND TO UNDERMINE THE PRINCIPLE OF SEPARATE REDUCTION PHASES SEPARATELY NEGOTIATED. HOWEVER, EVEN IF IT WERE NOT POSSIBLE TO GIVE A PRECISE COMMITMENT ON THE TIMING OF PHASE II REDUCTIONS, SOME GENERAL COMMITMENT ON THE TIMING OF THE ENFORCEMENT OF THE COMMON CEILING WITHIN A REASONABLE PERIOD COMBINED WITH A MORE BINDING COMMITMENT TO THE LENGTH OF THE PERIOD BETWEEN PHASES MIGHT BE FEASIBLE.

PARA 13. WHILST WE AGREE THAT SOME MODIFICATION TO OUR PRESENT DEMANDS FOR THE WITHDRAWAL OF A SOVIET TANK

ARMY IS APPROPRIATE FOR INCLUSION IN A WESTERN LIMITED PACKAGE, WE HAVE SOME RESERVATIONS ABOUT INCLUDING IN SUCH A PACKAGE THE IDEA OF SEEKING THE WITHDRAWAL OF FIVE SOVIET DIVISIONS IN PLACE OF A TANK ARMY. THERE IS AT PRESENT AN INCONSISTENCY IN THE AGREED NATO POSITION SEEKING THE WITHDRAWAL OF A COMPLETE TANK ARMY WITHOUT LIMITING THE NUMBER OF ARMIES REMAINING IN THE NGA (SEE CM(75)75 PARA 17). THERE ARE OF COURSE GOOD REASONS FOR NOT DEMANDING LIMITS ON THE NUMBER OF SOVIET TANK ARMIES. HOWEVER THIS INCONSISTENCY, WHICH WESTERN NEGOTIATORS HAVE HAD TO FACE, WOULD IN NO WAY BECOME LESS OF A PROBLEM IF THE WEST WERE TO CALL FOR THE WITHDRAWAL OF FIVE DIVISIONS IN PLACE OF A TANK ARMY. INDEED IT COULD BE ARGUED THAT SUCH A MOVE WOULD MERELY DRAW ATTENTION TO THIS ANOMALY AND MIGHT LEAD THE EAST TO BELIEVE THAT NATO WOULD BE WILLING EVENTUALLY TO ALLOW THE SOVIET UNION TO WITHDRAW ITS TANKS AND MANPOWER AT WILL (A CONCESSION WHICH WE BELIEVE WOULD BE UNACCEPTABLE IN THE PRESENT STAGE OF THE NEGOTIATIONS).

WE NEVERTHELESS BELIEVE THAT A MODIFICATION WHICH CONTINUES TO INCORPORATE THE EXISTING DEMAND FOR THE WITHDRAWAL OF 68,000 MEN AND 1700 TANKS IS WORTH OF FURTHER CONSIDERATION, RECOGNISING THAT THE VARIOUS OPTIONS FOR MODIFYING THE EXISTING WESTERN PROPOSAL WILL

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HAVE TO BE THE SUBJECT OF DETAILED STUDY IN BRUSSELS.

ON THE QUESTION OF LIMITING ANCILLARY EQUIPMENT ASSOCIATED WITH A TANK ARMY, WE BELIEVE THAT A WESTERN PACKAGE COULD CONTAIN A CONCESSION ON THIS POINT. IF NATO WANTS CONTINUED FREEDOM TO STOCKPILE EQUIPMENT FOLLOWING AN MBFR AGREEMENT, THEN IT SHOULD BE PREPARED TO PERMIT THE WARSAW PACT TO DO THE SAME. HOWEVER THE MILITARY EFFECTS OF SUCH A CONCESSION HAVE YET TO BE FULLY STUDIED IN BRUSSELS. FOR EXAMPLE, IF OFFERED THIS KIND OF CONCESSION, THE SOVIET UNION WOULD IN PRACTICE BE ABLE TO USE THE ANCILLARY EQUIPMENT ASSOCIATED WITH THEIR WITHDRAWN UNITS TO INCREASE THE EQUIPMENT HOLDINGS OF UNITS REMIANING IN THE NGA. WOULD THE SOVIET UNION BE LIKELY TO TAKE ADVANTAGE OF THIS POSSIBILITY AND WHAT MIGHT BE THE CONSEQUENCES IN TERMS OF INCREASED COMBAT CAPABILITY? WE BELIEVE THEREFORE THAT A STUDY OF THE CONSEQUENCES OF SUCH A CONCESSION SHOULD BE INITIATED AS

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SOON AS POSSIBLE SO THAT ITS FINDINGS CAN BE TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT WHEN DECIDING FINALLY ON THE CONTENT OF A PACKAGE.

IN THE ATTACHED DRAFT GUIDANCE TO THE AD HOC GROUP WE HAVE INCORPORATED TWO POSSIBLE ALTERNATIVES, THE FIRST (WHICH MIGHT BE MORE APPROPRIATE IN A LIMITED PACKAGE) SIMPLY CLARIFYING THE WESTERN POSITION ON THE LIMITATION OF ANCILLARY EQUIPMENT, THE SECOND IN ADDITION MODIFYING THE PRESENT TANK ARMY PROPOSAL TO ONE REQUIRING THE WITHDRAWAL OF FIVE INDIVIDUAL DIVISIONS (THIS ILLUSTRATES HOW THE GERMAN PROPOSAL MIGHT WORK OUT IN PRACTICE).

BOTH ALTERNATIVES MAKE THE ASSUMPTION THAT THE ANCILLARY EQUIPMENT COULD EITHER BE STOCKPILED IN THE NGA OR WITHDRAWN TO THE SOVIET UNION. THE LATTER IMPLIES, IN THE ABSENCE OF LIMITATIONS, THAT IT COULD ALSO BE REINTRODUCED INTO THE NGA FOR OTHER MILITARY PURPOSES. IN ADDITION, THE SECOND ALTERNATIVE ASSUMES THAT:

(I) THE WEST WOULD RETAIN ITS DEMAND FOR THE WITHDRAWAL OF 68,000 MEN AND 1700 TANKS. HOWEVER THE

RATIONALE FOR THESE PARTICULAR FIGURES BECOMES EVEN LESS CLEAR UNDER A PROPOSAL TO WITHDRAW FIVE SPEARATE DIVISIONS THAN UNDER THE PRESENT DEMAND FOR THE WITHDRAWAL OF A COMPLETE TANK ARMY. THUS, IF THE IDEA IN THE GERMAN PAPER WAS ADOPTED, CONSIDERATION WOULD NEED TO BE GIVEN TO THE POSSIBILITY OF ADJUSTING THE SIZE OF THE MANPOWER AND TANK WITHDRAWALS AND THE LEVEL OF SUBSEQUENT LIMITATIONS. AT PRESENT HOWEVER WE FEEL THERE IS NO SCOPE FOR LEVELLING DOWN THESE DEMANDS. INDEED IN VIEW OF THE CHANGES IN THE BALANCE OF FORCES THAT HAVE OCCURRED SINCE THE FORMULATION OF THIS REQUIREMENT, THERE ARE MILITARY GROUNDS FOR INCREASING THE DEMAND;

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(II) THE SOVIET UNION WOULD BE GIVEN DISCRETION OVER WHICH DIVISIONS THEY SHOULD WITHDRAW. SUCH A PROVISION MIGHT BE FELT TO GIVE THE EAST TOO MUCH LICENCE TO MINIMISE THE CONSEQUENCES OF WITHDRAWAL, FOR EXAMPLE BY TAKING ALL FIVE DIVISIONS FROM OUTSIDE THE GSFG. ON THE OTHER HAND, TO SPECIFY PARTICULAR DIVISIONS WOULD CLEARLY EXACERBATE THE NEGOTIATORS' TASK.

PARA 14. THIS PARAGRAPH RAISES AN ISSUE ON WHICH IT IS PRIMARILY FOR THE US TO COMMENT, ALTHOUGH WE MUST CONTINUE TO BE ALIVE TO THE IMPLICATIONS OF SUCH A CONCESSION FOR PHASE II REDUCTIONS. THE UK HAS VENTURED TO INCLUDE THIS POINT ALSO IN THE DRAFT GUIDANCE FROM THE COUNCIL TO THE AD HOC GROUP.

PARA 15. THE STABILIZING MEASURES ALREADY PROPOSED BY THE WEST WOULD APPEAR ALREADY TO MEET THE CONCERN ABOUT A SHORT-TERM INCREASE IN FORCES IN THE AREA, ALTHOUGH WE SHOULD BE HAPPY TO STUDY FURTHER MEASURES WHICH MAY BE PROPOSED, WHILE BEARING IN MIND THE NEED TO AVOID UNACCEPTABLE CONSTRAINTS ON THE MOVEMENT INTO THE AREA OF US, UK AND CANADIAN FORCES.

PARAS 18-26. THE UK DOES NOT UNDERSTAND THE PURPOSE OF THE INTERIM PROTOCOL PROPOSAL. IT SEEMS TO US THAT IF EAST AND WEST WERE WILLING TO AGREE TO ALL THE PRINCIPLES SUGGESTED, THEN WE SHOULD BE SO FAR DOWN THE ROAD TO AN OVERALL AGREEMENT THAT IT WOULD SCARCELY

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BE WORTH GOING FOR AN INTERIM PROTOCOL. THE PROPOSAL IN PARA 25 WOULD APPEAR TO IMPLY THAT THERE WOULD BE AT LEAST A FREEZE, OR EVEN UNILATERAL REDUCTIONS, IN EASTERN FORCE LEVELS, WHILE THE WEST WOULD BE ALLOWED TO INCREASE ITS FORCES BY UP TO 176,000 MEN. IT IS HARD TO IMAGINE THE EAST AGREEING TO THIS.

POSSIBLE DRAFT GUIDANCE FROM THE COUNCIL TO THE AD HOC GROUP

/

4. THERE FOLLOWS THE TEXT OF A POSSIBLE DRAFT GUIDANCE IN ADDITION TO THE MODIFICATION OF THE PROPOSAL FOR THE WITHDRAWAL OF A SOVIET TANK ARMY AND THE INDICATION THAT THE BULK OF US WITHDRAWALS IN PHASE I WOULD BE BY UNITS, THE UK CONSIDERS THAT IT WOULD ALSO BE WORTH INCLUDING IN THE INITIATIVE THE ASSURANCE ON FOLLOW-ON AIRCRAFT WHICH HAS ALREADY BEEN AGREED WITHIN THE ALLIANCE BUT

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NOT YET DEPLOYED IN THE NEGOTIATIONS. OTHER ELEMENTS, IN PARTICULAR ON THE TIME REQUIREMENT BETWEEN THE PHASES AND THE TIME REQUIRED TO ESTABLISH THE COMMON COLLECTIVE CEILING, COULD ALSO BE ADDED.

TEXT -- POSSIBLE DRAFT GUIDANCE  
FROM THE COUNCIL TO THE AD HOC GROUP

1. ALLIED NEGOTIATORS ARE AUTHORIZED TO PRESENT TO THE EAST THE FOLLOWING MODIFICATIONS TO THE EXISTING WESTERN PROPOSALS. THEY SHOULD MAKE IT CLEAR THAT THESE CHANGE WHICH TAKE ACCOUNT OF CERTAIN CONCERNS WHICH HAVE BEEN EXPRESSED BY THE EAST IN THE COURSE OF THE NEGOTIATIONS ARE INTENDED AS A SERIOUS ATTEMPT TO MOVE THE NEGOTIATIONS FORWARD AND THAT A SERIOUS AND CONSTRUCTIVE RESPONSE WILL BE EXPECTED FROM THE EAST.

2. HITHERTO THE WESTERN PROPOSAL FOR WITHDRAWALS BY THE SOVIET UNION IN PHASE I HAS BEEN THAT THE SOVIET UNION SHOULD WITHDRAW FROM THE AREA OF REDUCTIONS TO THE USSR A TANK ARMY CONSISTING OF FIVE DIVISIONS INCLUDING SOME 68,000 MEN AND 1700 MAIN BATTLE TANKS.

EITHER

//THE WESTERN PARTICIPANTS WISH TO MAKE IT CLEAR THAT THIS PROPOSAL DOES NOT PLACE ANY LIMITATIONS ON THE OVERALL RESIDUAL HOLDINGS OF SOVIET COMBAT EQUIPMENT (OTHER THAN TANKS) IN THE REDUCTIONS AREA OF THE TYPES ASSOCIATED WITH THE WITHDRAWN TANK ARMY. EQUIPMENT OTHER THAN TANKS COULD BE WITHDRAWN TO THE SOVIET UNION OR STOCKPILED IN THE REDUCTIONS AREA. LIMITATIONS WOULD HOWEVER BE IMPOSED ON THE OVERALL RESIDUAL TOTAL OF

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SOVIET GROUND AND AIR FORCE MANPOWER AND MAIN BATTLE TANKS IN THE REDUCTIONS AREA. IF THE STRENGTH OF THE TANK ARMY TO BE WITHDRAWN WERE INSUFFICIENT TO MEET THE SPECIFIC REQUIREMENT FOR THE WITHDRAWAL OF 68,000 MEN AND 1700 MAIN BATTLE TANKS, THE SHORTFALL WOULD HAVE TO BE MADE UP BY EQUIVALENT WITHDRAWALS FROM COMBAT UNITS REMAINING IN THE REDUCTIONS AREA.//

OR:

//THE WESTERN PARTICIPANTS ARE NOW PREPARED TO MODIFY THIS PROPOSAL AS FOLLOWS:

A. THE SOVIET UNION SHOULD WITHDRAW FROM THE REDUCTIONS AREA TO THE USSR 68,000 SOLDIERS AND 1700 MAIN BATTLE TANKS INCLUDING FIVE COMBAT DIVISIONS. THE SOVIET UNION WOULD BE GIVEN FREEDOM TO CHOOSE WHICH COMBAT DIVISIONS SHOULD BE WITHDRAWN, AND THUS WHAT PROPORTION OF THE 68,000 MEN AND 1700 TANKS SHOULD BE WITHDRAWN IN THIS WAY. THE SOVIET UNION WOULD ALSO BE

GIVEN FREEDOM TO DECIDE HOW TO IMPLEMENT THE RESULTING BALANCE OF MANPOWER AND TANK REDUCTIONS TO FULFIL THE TOTAL WITHDRAWAL REQUIREMENT, PROVIDED THAT ALL REDUCTIONS WERE FROM COMBAT UNITS.

B. SUBSEQUENT TO THESE WITHDRAWALS:

- (I) A NUMERICAL LIMITATION WOULD BE IMPOSED ON THE OVERALL RESIDUAL TOTAL OF SOVIET

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GROUND AND AIR FORCE MANPOWER IN THE  
REDUCTIONS AREA;

- (II) A NUMERICAL LIMITATION WOULD SIMILARLY BE  
IMPOSED ON THE OVERALL RESIDUAL TOTAL OF  
SOVIET MAIN BATTLE TANKS IN THE REDUCTIONS  
AREA;  
(III) THERE WOULD BE NO LIMITATIONS IMPOSED ON  
THE OVERALL RESIDUAL HOLDINGS OF SOVIET  
COMBAT EQUIPMENT (OTHER THAN TANKS) IN THE  
REDUCTIONS AREA OF THE TYPES HELD BY THE  
FIVE DIVISIONS TO BE WITHDRAWN. THE EQUIP-  
MENT (OTHER THAN TANKS) BELONGING TO THESE

DIVISIONS COULD EITHER BE WITHDRAWN TO THE  
SOVIET UNION OR STOCKPILED IN THE REDUC-  
TIONS AREA.//

3. HITHERTO THE ALLIED PROPOSAL FOR WITHDRAWALS BY THE  
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UNITED STATES IN PHASE I HAS BEEN THAT THE UNITED STATES  
WOULD WITHDRAW 29,000 MEN BUT (BECAUSE OF THE ASYMMETRY  
OF CONDITIONS) WOULD HAVE FREEDOM TO MAKE THESE WITH-  
DRAWALS AS IT WISHED. THE ALLIES ARE NOW PREPARED TO  
OFFER THAT THE UNITED STATES WOULD MAKE THE BULK OF THE  
REDUCTION OF 29,000 MEN BY UNITS RATHER THAN INDIVIDUAL-  
LY.

4. IN THEIR PROPOSALS OF 16 DECEMBER 1975, THE ALLIES  
OFFERED, ON CERTAIN CONDITIONS, THAT AS A ONE-TIME  
COMPLEMENT TO THE WESTERN REDUCTION CONTRIBUTION, THE  
UNITED STATES WOULD WITHDRAW FROM THE AREA OF REDUCTIONS  
TO THE UNITED STATES A SUBSTANTIAL PROPORTION OF ITS  
NUCLEAR CAPABILITY IN EUROPE, NAMELY 1,000 US NUCLEAR  
WARHEADS, 54 US NUCLEAR-CAPABLE F4 AIRCRAFT AND 36 US  
PERSHING BALLISTIC MISSILE LAUNCHERS. IT WAS ALSO STATED  
THAT: "AGREEMENT TO REDUCE CERTAIN ELEMENTS INCLUDES  
IMPLICITLY A CEILING ON THOSE ELEMENTS AT THEIR REDUCED  
LEVELS." THE ALLIES NOW WISH TO CLARIFY THIS STATEMENT.  
THE REDUCTION OF US NUCLEAR-CAPABLE F4'S PROPOSED BY THE  
WEST IN DECEMBER 1975 WOULD RESULT IN A NUMERICAL LIMIT-  
ATION ON THE AGGREGATE TOTAL OF ALL US AIRCRAFT OF  
NUCLEAR-CAPABLE MODELS IN THE AREA OF REDUCTIONS.  
THE NUMBER OF SUCH US AIRCRAFT IN THE AREA COULD NOT  
EXCEED THE NUMBER IN THE AREA FOLLOWING PHASE I REDUC-  
TIONS, WITH SUITABLE EXCEPTIONS TO PERMIT NORMAL TRAIN-  
ING AND EXERCISES. THE NUMERICAL LIMITATION WOULD APPL  
FOR EXAMPLE TO NUCLEAR-CAPABLE MODELS OF THE US F16 IF  
SUCH AIRCRAFT MODELS ARE DEPLOYED TO THE AREA OF  
REDUCTIONS.

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## Message Attributes

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**Office:** ACTION ACDA  
**Original Classification:** SECRET  
**Original Handling Restrictions:** n/a  
**Original Previous Classification:** n/a  
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**Previous Handling Restrictions:** n/a  
**Reference:** 77 LONDON 14769, 77 STATE 211556  
**Retention:** 0  
**Review Action:** RELEASED, APPROVED  
**Review Content Flags:**  
**Review Date:** 22-Nov-2004 12:00:00 am  
**Review Event:**  
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**Review Media Identifier:**  
**Review Release Date:** n/a  
**Review Release Event:** n/a  
**Review Transfer Date:**  
**Review Withdrawn Fields:** n/a  
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**Status:** NATIVE  
**Subject:** POSSIBLE FUTURE STEPS IN MBFR NEGOTIATIONS  
**TAGS:** PARM, MOPS, GE, UK, US, NATO, MBFR  
**To:** STATE  
**Type:** TE  
**vdkvgwkey:** odbc://SAS/SAS.dbo.SAS\_Docs/fa509849-c288-dd11-92da-001cc4696bcc  
**Review Markings:**  
Margaret P. Grafeld  
Declassified/Released  
US Department of State  
EO Systematic Review  
22 May 2009  
**Markings:** Margaret P. Grafeld Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 22 May 2009